Dispite the conventional wisdom, the techniques of warfare
did evolve during the Medieval years. This was so, even though
the social order in Medieval Europe was unusually stable.
This social system developed in the Early
Middle Ages (A.D. 700-1000) as a result of changes in prevailing
military practices. The barbarian kingdoms erected on the
ruins of the Roman Empire had generally treated all free adult
males as equals before the law, with an equal obligation to
render military service. This assumption of a universal male
military obligation remained in force over the centuries even
as the barbarian kingdoms became increasingly settled and
civilized. The form which such service took was usually that
of infantryman, with each man required to bring his own arms
when called. Armies were thus primarily militia forces, although
the king might have a small band of full- time "henchmen"
in his service who may be considered professional soldiers.
This adequately provided for defense in terms of the types
of threat which confronted the various Western European kingdoms
in this period. Beginning in the Eighth Century, however,
threats of a different nature began to beset the West: the
Vikings, the Arabs, and the Hungarians
The nature of the threat posed by the Vikings, the Arabs,
and the Hungarians was different from those experienced previously.
These peoples were raiders, intent upon plundering what they
could, although not adverse to making a land grab if the opportunity
was offered. The Vikings raided Western Europe's Atlantic
littoral from the sea, while the Arabs did so along the Mediterranean
coast, and the Hungarians rode rough-shod over much of Central
Europe from the Great Hungarian Plain. These peoples moved
far too swiftly for the militia levies. Only forces of comparable
mobility, that is on horseback, could possibly muster in sufficient
time and move with sufficient speed to catch the raiders before
they were off once more.
But mounted forces are difficult to sustain. Horses are expensive
. Moreover, mastering the skills of mounted combat was a full-time
job. Ultimately, the feudal system was born out of the need
to support a class of professional mounted soldiers. A lord
would endow a man with land and peasants so that he could
procure suitable mounts and equipment, and then prepare and
maintain himself and his mount in perpetual readiness for
military service.
The new military system proved quite successful. The Viking,
Arab, and Hungarian threats were largely beaten off by the
end of the Tenth Century. The success of the innovative mounted
armies naturally reduced the status of, and the necessity
for, the old freeborn militia infantry, so that it became
increasingly rare for the commoner militia to be called upon
to render military service. The superior fighting qualities
of the professional mounted warriors as opposed to the increasingly
amateurish militia further enhanced the status of the horsemen.
Eventually the levy of all able-bodied adult males virtually
disappeared. The mounted soldier --the knight or man-at-arms
with armor and sword and lance-- had become the undisputed
master of the battlefield, able to sweep all before him in
one mighty charge. Now there was, at first, no inherent notion
of hereditary claim by a mounted soldier to the lands allocated
for his support, but this began to evolve even as the new
military system successfully beat off the various threats.
By the end of the 10th Century the feudal system was firmly
established.
One unfortunate side-effect of the new system was that it
decentralized government to such an extent that the title
"king" was, in most countries merely an honorific
held by one of the greater nobles. Thus, there was no one
to restrain the lords from fighting with each other, and private
war was fairly common, as different lords sought to wipe-out
alleged insults or, more practically, to steal from their
neighbors. Efforts by the Church to curb such activities had
some effect, and by the 12th Century Western Europe was experiencing
a degree of stability unknown since before the Fall of Rome
seven centuries earlier.
Meanwhile. there seemed to be no way to defeat the mounted
knight with any degree on consistency. However, fortifications
could frustrate even the most capable knights. Strongholds,
of course, were primordal factors in war. After the Fall of
Rome all manner of ancient Roman, but quite sturdy, structures
, from castles to amphitheaters, and from palaces to watchtowers,
were pressed into service as fortifications. This enabled
many people to survive the barbarian storm, for the latter
were inept at siegecraft.
The use of fortifications multiplied in the Dark Ages, particularly
as siege techniques remained fairly rudimentary. Fortified
places were an inherent part of the new mounted defense system
which developed to meet the Viking, Arab, and Hungarian threats.
In the event of a raid the local populace could flee to the
nearest strongplace --perhaps a walled town, a castle or fortified
manor or a stoutly built church-- where, under the direction
of the local captain --a professional mounted warrior holding
his lands from the crown, or one of the crown's lesser lords--
they could attempt to hold out until the regional contingent
of men-at-arms rode to their relief.
Initially such strongpoints were relatively simple, sometimes
no more than a mound of earth with a moat and palisade and
perhaps a tower of heavy timbers, construction in stone having
fallen out of fashion with the demise of Rome. As anyone attacking
such a place usually had no notion of how to take it save
by starvation or storm, one was generally fairly safe in such
a "motte-and-bailey" castle, for raiders usually
had little time to starve such a place out, and might not
be inclined to pay the price of taking it by storm. Gradually,
however, siege techniques became more sophisticated. After
all, wooden palisades and towers can be burned, and devices
can be improvised for hurling fire and rock over them. Stone
therefore once again began to become common in fortification.
By the height of the Feudal Age (A.D. 1000-1300) Europe was
dotted with fortified places. By way of example we may note
that in the 14th Century there were, in an area of approximately
1050 square kilometers just south of the forest of Fontainebleau
in France, twelve forts, 28 fortified churches, five towers,
four fortified manor houses, and six full-fledged castles,
for a total of 55 fortified places, or roughly one for every
19 square kilometers. Few people were more than a 15-20 minute
walk from a place of refuge. This was, of course, after several
centuries of development of the prevailing military system.
Thus, at the height of the Feudal Age military activities
were characterized and defined by two basic factors: the heavily
armed, professional mounted soldier and the fortified place.
Both of these were relatively unbeatable, but did possess
some serious disadvantages. One of these was expense. The
full panoply of a knight, including armor, weapons, and a
couple of horses, plus equipment for a squire, a page, and
perhaps one or two additional retainers, could cost more than
180,000 ducats at a time when 2,500 ducats a year was a fairly
good income. The annual cost to maintain this crew was 15,000-20,000
ducats. Since a knight's daily honorarium was usually about
50 ducats, active service could not bring in enough money
to cover expenses. If he served a full year he might earn
10,000 ducats, less room and board (and another 10,000 ducats
for his retainers). Moreover it was rare for a knight to serve
for an entire year. Normally they rendered only their obligatory
40-days or so, plus a few months here or there as the martial
spirit moved him. Even a cut-rate outfit could come to perhaps
60,000 ducats, though the kit and nag one might get for that
sort of investment might appreciably affect one's life expectancy
in battle. Little wonder, then, that the military system of
the Feudal Era required landed wealth to support the knights.
And fortifications were far more expensive than knights.
The combination of mounted knight and fortified place was
the dominant military pattern throughout Western Europe during
the Feudal Age. To be sure, it sometimes failed, as when some
North Italian urban (city) militia spearmen defeated the mailed
men-at-arms of the Holy Roman Emperor at Legnano in 1176,
or as at Chateau-Gaillard, a great fortress on the Seine between
Paris and Rouenf, but such reverses were exceptions, and could
be explained away. The relative invincibility of the military
system contributed to the enormous stability of the social
system. Nevertheless, by the 14th Century the knight was beginning
to encounter some more serious resistance to his domination
of the battlefield, in the form of distinctly lower class
Swiss pikemen, who several times diced up Habsburg knightly
armies by means of a solid phalanx of pikepoints and lots
of determination. And equally low class Englishmen were learning
to use a new weapon Edward I had coopted as a result of his
conquest of Wales, the longbow. Meanwhile, society was becoming
increasingly complex, commerce was booming, towns were growing
rapidly, and there was a trend towards the reassertion of
royal domination in most countries, while the middle level
lords had pretty much eclipsed the lower ranking ones in influence.
And something else was beginning to appear on the scene which
would eclipse both knight and castle, and ultimately help
overturn the entire social and political order of Feudal Europe,
gunpowder , and cannon .
During the Hundred Years War England was trying to assert
the claim of its kings to the throne of France. The war was
characterized by long periods of inactivity punctuated by
occassional battles engendered by raids or sieges. The English
military system, based on the long bow, proved virtually unbeatable
on the battlefield by the French, who relied heavily on the
traditional man-at-arms. Put simply, on the battlefield the
English normally adopted the tactical defensive. Carefully
selecting sites with well-protected flanks, they dismounted
their men-at-arms to form a defensive line of spearmen, and
interspersed large blocks of longbowmen among them. The French
would invariably attack, or could be provoked into attacking
by long-range arrow strikes. When they came on, whether horsed
or dismounted, they would be plastered with tens of thousands
of arrows.
Not until the latter portion of the 14th Century did the French
finally develop a strategy with which the English could not
cope. This was the work of Bernard Du Guesclin (1320?- 1380),
Constable of France under the able King Charles V (reigned
1364-1380). Du Guesclin recognized that the English were unbeatable
tactically. But, while they could win battles using their
longbows and thus gain territory, they had to rely on fortifications
in order to hold it. So he adopted a strategy of attrition
which avoided open battles with the fearsome longbowmen and
relied upon ambushes, night attacks, guerrilla raids, feints,
calculated withdrawals, and sieges, for which he used an effective,
if modestly sized, artillery train.
The strategy worked well. In a series of campaigns between
1368 and 1380 the English were driven out of virtually all
of France. Du Guesclin's artillery helped get him into many
of the lesser fortified places, which was a big help, but
it was too light to batter a way into the more stoutly built
castles and cities, which had to be reduced by more conventional
sieges. The English proved incapable of coping with this strategy.
Because Du Guesclin consistently, and intelligently, refused
battle under any circumstances, there was not a single pitched
battle in the traditional style (i.e., with the English longbowmen
shooting down the French men-at-arms) during the entire dozen
years of fighting.
Du Guesclin's highly unorthodox techniques caused his enemies
--who included many high-born Frenchmen desireous of stabbing
the low-born Constable in the back-- to accuse him of "unchivalrous"
and "cowardly" conduct. The fact that English longbows
were not one whit more chivalrous than French guile and artillery
was overlooked, of course, as was the fact that Du Guesclin's
tactics worked.
In 1380, on the verge of total victory, Du Guesclin and his
able master both died. By this time the English were confined
to a few cities along the coast of southwestern France, in
the ancient province of Aquitaine, and were neither able nor
inclined to resume hostilities. The war thus entered another
long period of inactivity. Surprisingly, despite the evidence
of the increasing inability of fortified places to cope with
artillery, little attention was paid to improving fortifications
to make them better able to resist gunfire. After all, even
Du Guesclin's artillery train was unable to reduce the more
extensively fortified places. Progress in gunnery continued
in the decades after Du Guesclin's death.
The Du Guesclin period of the Hundred Years War, and the years
immediately following it, had a considerable influence on
the growth of artillery.Nor was this influence confined to
France and England, for the innovations spread rapidly. Moreover,
guns were beginning to appear on the battlefield with some
regularity.
Early evidence for the use of cannon in the field is poor.
Indeed, after a brief, somewhat suspect, mention of their
use at Crecy in 1346, we have no certain information for over
forty years, until the famed Italian condottiero Giovanni
Acuto --originally a low-born Englishman named John Hawkwood--
encountered some at the Battle of Castagnaro (11 March 1387).
Hawkwood's outnumbered Paduans do not seem to have had any
cannon, but their Veronese foemen had 20 bombards and three
144-barrel ribaults. Despite an inferiority in firepower,
Hawkwood came away with an overwhelming victory, the result
of a brilliantly conducted flank attack. Gunpowder had been
of but slight influence on the course the battle. The cannon
of the age had virtually no tactical mobility, were extremely
slow firing, and had little accuracy. While these disadvantages
did not seriously impede their use in sieges, it made them
virtually useless in pitched battles. Hawkwood, among others,
could not help but notice that this new innovation would most
likely grow in importance over time.
Although cannon would be present at many battles over the
next half-century, their outcomes were not influenced by that
fact. Thus, at the Battle of Agincourt (25 October 1415) --during
yet another round in the Hundred Years War-- the presence
of a considerable contingent of artillery with the French
did not prevent yet another generation of English longbowmen
from mowing down the French men-at-arms, this time deployed
as a dismounted phalanx of pikemen. Indeed, the artillery
managed to get off only a few rounds before it was masked
by the advance of the men-at-arms, and thus managed to inflict
but one fatality on the English.
During this period, only the Hussites demonstrated how effective
gunpower weapons could be during the early 15th century. But
they were basically a bunch of religious heretics who were
eventually brought down by sheer wait of numbers, and their
own internal disputes. Meanwhile, significant developments
were taking place elsewhere in Europe during the same period.
In 1415 King Henry V of England (reigned 1413-1422) resumed
the interminable Hundred Years War with an invasion of Normandy.
His brilliance as a strategist and politician soon made him
master of much of France. Militarily, the English continued
to rely on their time-tested longbows, which contributed to
yet another victory over men-at-arms at Agincourt. In addition
they had a considerable train of artillery, which proved useful
in taking French fortresses. French resistance was inept,
due to both military and political weakness. So succesful
was Henry that France's Charles VI (reigned 1380-1422), surnamed
"the Foolish", renounced his own son in favor of
Henry's son, giving him a daughter to wed to seal the bargain,
and produce the heir. Feeble resistance continued on the part
of the disinherited Dauphin Charles, but it looked like the
war had ended in an English victory.
The deaths of both King Henry and King Charles within weeks
of each other in 1422 had no noticeable effect on the course
of the war, for Henry's able brothers managed to hold things
together for their infant nephew, Henry VI (reigned 1422-1461
& 1470-1471). In the period 1422-1428 English control
was gradually extended to all of France north of the Loire,
save for Orleans. The siege of Orleans (September 1428 - 8
May 1429) proved to be the turning point in the war. The numerous
but demoralized defenders benefited from some excellent fortifications,
as well as some 70 pieces of artillery of all types brought
to the city before the siege. This was probably the greatest
concentration of guns in the world at the time. These kept
the English out.
Cannon were not yet powerful enough to batter down such stout
walls, though they could be very effective at smashing gates
and outworks. They were also quite useful in creating fires
and could inflict casualties. But techniques had been developed
to bolster the defenses of gates and outworks, and neither
fires nor casualties were unanticipated events in a siege.
The fact that the French were able to respond to English firepower
with their own also helped. Nevertheless, given sufficient
time Orleans would have fallen. That it did not was due to
Joan of Arc (1412-1431). Joan inspired the defenders to renewed
efforts and the English were forced to abandon the siege.
Joan went on to lead a counteroffensive over the next few
weeks which yielded the first French victories since Du Guesclin,
culminating in the coronation of the Dauphin as Charles VII
(reigned 1422-1461) in newly liberated Rheims. France now
had two kings, one the infant son of Henry V, the other the
newly crowned son of the last French king.
The war soon entered a new phase, as Frenchmen of all classes
began to feel the stirrings of nationalism. This was strengthened
when the English foolishly burned the "Maid of Orleans"
as a witch on 30 May 1431. As a martyr Joan was even more
valuable to France than as a maid-at-arms. Over the next dozen
years the French gradually drove the English back, clearing
most of Northern France. In 1444 a truce was arranged, leaving
the English with Normandy and Aquitaine.
The French used the truce to totally reorganize their army.
Charles VII may have been a relatively dim bulb, but he had
several able advisors, among them the Duke of Alencon, a good
general, who had provided the military smarts for Joan; the
Constable de Richemont, a capable commander and administrator;
and the Brothers Bureau , who were first class military managers
and organizers as well as being fine generals. These men thoroughly
reorganized the French state and army. Administration of government
was centralized, local autonomy curbed in the interests of
the great national struggle. The national finances were reorganized
and put on a rational basis, with a resulting windfall to
the treasury. This money was used to finance extensive military
reforms. A new army was created. The troops were organized
into well-disciplined formations --even the men-at-arms--
with clearly defined ranks, a standardized tactical doctrine
was introduced, proper rationing allowances and regular pay
were established, and a formal chain of command instituted.
Enormous sums were expended on the artillery, which was completely
revamped. Now it was considered an integral part of the army,
with a well-defined role in cooperation with the horse and
foot.
The equipment was modernized and standardized, and the pieces
were properly mounted on mobile carriages. This was made possible
because improvements in metallurgy, and particularly in cannon
founding, made it practical to reduce the weight of metal
in guns without affecting their capabilities. In addition,
trunnions .may have been introduced at this time, axle-like
appendages emerging from the underside of the barrel at the
piece's center of gravity, which permitted more efficient
elevation and training, to the great improvement of accuracy.
Cheaper and more effective iron cannon balls definitively
replaced stone, which was as likely to shatter on masonry
as to shatter it. The crews were professionally organized
and paid, formally trained, and subject to proper discipline.
One of the most important elements in the technical reform
of the French army came in the form of a significant advance
in the making of gunpowder. Early forms of gunpowder were
essentially just carefully blended mixtures of saltpeter,
sulphur, and charcoal in the prescribed proportions. By the
early 15th Century efforts were being made to insure more
efficient mixing. Everything was reduced to fine powders,
blended together, and sieved to insure a consistent, but relatively
loose mixture. Unfortunately each of the three ingredients
has a different specific gravity, with the result that they
settle out when in storage, so that it was common for early
artillerymen to mix their powder on the spot.
The new French army quickly proved itself a superb instrument.
Within weeks of the renewal of the war, the English were on
the defensive on all fronts. The French invaded Normandy and
systematicly set about reducing strongholds. So good had their
artillery become that great fortresses easily succumbed to
the pounding of the French guns. Castle after castle fell.
More importantly, the new cannon enabled the French to defeat
the traditional English longbow tactics in a pitched battle
for the first time in over a century. At the Battle of Formigny
on 15 April 1450 the English deployed as had their ancestors
at Crecy and Poitiers and Agincourt, with dismounted men-at-arms
covering their front supported by their longbowmen in the
center and on the flanks. The French deployed in similar fashion,
with their spearmen covering a broad front supported by crossbowmen.
But they also positioned two cannon on their flanks, six-
or eight-pounder culverins, long-barreled pieces firing upwards
of 1,000 yards, greatly outranging the English bows. These
wrought terrible execution in the English ranks, provoking
them into a charge. The English were cut to pieces by the
combined attentions of the French spears, crossbows, and cannon.
Nearly 4,000 of them fell at a cost of perhaps 100 French
lives. It was a victory such as France had never experienced
and it was due, in large measure, to France's modern artillery.
Within five months of Formigny, the first pitched battle in
which artillery played a decisive role, all Normandy was in
French hands. Some 60 castles, cities, and fortresses had
been taken in the space of a year, the average siege lasting
but six days. So effective were the new cannon that many places
surrendered on terms as soon as the French emplaced their
guns. The French pressed on, and over the next few years secured
repeated success in both sieges and battles until the English
were completely driven from France in 1453, after yet another
disastrous tactical defeat at Castillon (17 July 1453). It
was a stunning recovery and a remarkable victory, and it was
largely attributable to French superiority in firearms.
So in 1453 gunpowder brought an end not only to the Hundred
Years's War, but also to the last remnant of the Roman Empire,
making that year a the principal milestone marking the end
of the Middle Ages.
|
|
